Network Working Group Request for Comments: 4051 Category: Standards Track D. Eastlake 3rd Motorola Laboratories April 2005

Additional XML Security Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)

Status of This Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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Abstract

A number of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) intended for use with XML Digital Signatures, Encryption, and Canonicalization are defined. These URIs identify algorithms and types of keying information.

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1. Introduction

XML Digital Signatures, Canonicalization, and Encryption have been standardized by the W3C and the joint IETF/W3C XMLDSIG working group. All of these are now W3C Recommendations and IETF Informational or Standards Track documents. They are available as follows:

IETF level		W3C REC	Topic
	-		
[RFC3275]	Draft Std	[XMLDSIG]	XML Digital Signatures
[RFC3076]	Info	[CANON]	Canonical XML
	-	[XMLENC]	XML Encryption
[RFC3741]	Info	[EXCANON]	Exclusive XML Canonicalization

All of these standards and recommendations use URIS [RFC2396] to identify algorithms and keying information types. This document provides a convenient reference list of URIs and descriptions for algorithms in which there is substantial interest, but which cannot or have not been included in the main documents. Note that raising XML digital signature to a Draft Standard in the IETF required removal of any algorithms for which interoperability from the main standards document has not been demonstrated. This required removal of the Minimal Canonicalization algorithm, in which there appears to be a continued interest, to be dropped from the standards track specification. It is included here.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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2. Algorithms

The URI [RFC2396] being dropped from the standard because of the transition from Proposed Standard to Draft Standard is included in Section 2.4 with its original prefix so as to avoid changing the XMLDSIG standard's namespace.

http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#

Additional algorithms are given URIs that start with:

http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#

An "xmldsig-more" URI does not imply any official W3C status for these algorithms or identifiers or that they are only useful in digital signatures. Currently, dereferencing such URIs may or may not produce a temporary placeholder document. Permission to use this URI prefix has been given by the W3C.

2.1. DigestMethod Algorithms

These algorithms are usable wherever a DigestMethod element occurs.

2.1.1. MD5

Identifier:

http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#md5

The MD5 algorithm [RFC1321] takes no explicit parameters. An example of an MD5 DigestAlgorithm element is:

<DigestAlgorithm
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#md5"/>

An MD5 digest is a 128-bit string. The content of the DigestValue element shall be the base64 [RFC2405] encoding of this bit string viewed as a 16-octet octet stream.

2.1.2. SHA-224

```
Identifier:
    http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#sha224
```

The SHA-224 algorithm [FIPS-180-2change, RFC3874] takes no explicit parameters. An example of a SHA-224 DigestAlgorithm element is:

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<DigestAlgorithm Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#sha224" />

A SHA-224 digest is a 224 bit string. The content of the DigestValue element shall be the base64 [RFC2405] encoding of this string viewed as a 28-octet stream. Because it takes roughly the same amount of effort to compute a SHA-224 message digest as a SHA-256 digest, and terseness is usually not a criteria in an XML application, consideration should be given to the use of SHA-256 as an alternative.

2.1.3. SHA-384

Identifier: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#sha384

The SHA-384 algorithm [FIPS-180-2] takes no explicit parameters. An example of a SHA-384 DigestAlgorithm element is:

<DigestAlgorithm

Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#sha384" />

A SHA-384 digest is a 384 bit string. The content of the DigestValue element shall be the base64 [RFC2405] encoding of this string viewed as a 48-octet stream. Because it takes roughly the same amount of effort to compute a SHA-384 message digest as a SHA-512 digest and terseness is usually not a criteria in XML application, consideration should be given to the use of SHA-512 as an alternative.

2.2. SignatureMethod Message Authentication Code Algorithms

Note: Some text in this section is duplicated from [RFC3275] for the convenience of the reader. RFC 3275 is normative in case of conflict.

2.2.1. HMAC-MD5

Identifier: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-md5

The HMAC algorithm [RFC2104] takes the truncation length in bits as a parameter; if the parameter is not specified then all the bits of the hash are output. An example of an HMAC-MD5 SignatureMethod element is as follows:

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The output of the HMAC algorithm is ultimately the output (possibly truncated) of the chosen digest algorithm. This value shall be base64 [RFC2405] encoded in the same straightforward fashion as the output of the digest algorithms. For example, the SignatureValue element for the HMAC-MD5 digest

9294727A 3638BB1C 13F48EF8 158BFC9D

from the test vectors in [RFC2104] would be

kpRyejY4uxwT9I74FYv8nQ==

Schema Definition:

DTD:

<!ELEMENT HMACOutputLength (#PCDATA) >

The Schema Definition and DTD immediately shown above are taken from [RFC3275].

Although some cryptographic suspicions have recently been cast on MD5 for use in signatures such as RSA-MD5 below, this does not effect use of MD5 in HMAC.

2.2.2. HMAC SHA Variations

Identifiers: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha224 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha384 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha512

SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 [FIPS-180-2, FIPS-180-2change, RFC3874] can also be used in HMAC as described in section 2.2.1 for HMAC-MD5.

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2.2.3. HMAC-RIPEMD160

Identifier: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-ripemd160

RIPEMD-160 [RIPEMD-160] can also be used in HMAC as described in section 2.2.1 for HMAC-MD5.

2.3. SignatureMethod Public Key Signature Algorithms

These algorithms are distinguished from those in Section 2.2 in that they use public key methods. The verification key is different from and not feasibly derivable from the signing key.

2.3.1. RSA-MD5

Identifier: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-md5

RSA-MD5 implies the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding algorithm described in [RFC3447]. An example of use is

<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-md5" />

The SignatureValue content for an RSA-MD5 signature is the base64 [RFC2405] encoding of the octet string computed as per [RFC3447], section 8.1.1, signature generation for the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme. As specified in the EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE function in [RFC3447, section 9.2.1], the value input to the signature function MUST contain a pre-pended algorithm object identifier for the hash function, but the availability of an ASN.1 parser and recognition of OIDs are not required of a signature verifier. The PKCS#1 v1.5 representation appears as:

CRYPT (PAD (ASN.1 (OID, DIGEST (data))))

Note that the padded ASN.1 will be of the following form:

01 | FF* | 00 | prefix | hash

Vertical bar ("|") represents concatenation. "01", "FF", and "00" are fixed octets of the corresponding hexadecimal value and the asterisk ("*") after "FF" indicates repetition. "hash" is the MD5 digest of the data. "prefix" is the ASN.1 BER MD5 algorithm designator prefix required in PKCS #1 [RFC3447], that is:

hex 30 20 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 02 05 05 00 04 10

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This prefix is included to facilitate the use of standard cryptographic libraries. The FF octet MUST be repeated enough times that the value of the quantity being CRYPTed is exactly one octet shorter than the RSA modulus.

Due to increases in computer processor power and advances in cryptography, use of RSA-MD5 is NOT RECOMMENDED.

2.3.2. RSA-SHA256

Identifier: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256

This implies the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding algorithm [RFC3447] as described in section 2.3.1, but with the ASN.1 BER SHA-256 algorithm designator prefix. An example of use is:

<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256" />

2.3.3 RSA-SHA384

Identifier: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha384

This implies the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding algorithm [RFC3447] as described in section 2.3.1, but with the ASN.1 BER SHA-384 algorithm designator prefix. An example of use is:

<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha384" />

Because it takes about the same effort to calculate a SHA-384 message digest as a SHA-512 message digest, it is suggested that RSA-SHA512 be used in preference to RSA-SHA384 where possible.

2.3.4. RSA-SHA512

```
Identifier:
    http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha512
```

This implies the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding algorithm [RFC3447] as described in section 2.3.1, but with the ASN.1 BER SHA-512 algorithm designator prefix. An example of use is:

```
<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha512" />
```

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2.3.5. RSA-RIPEMD160

```
Identifier:
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more/rsa-ripemd160
```

This implies the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding algorithm [RFC3447], as described in section 2.3.1, but with the ASN.1 BER RIPEMD160 algorithm designator prefix. An example of use is:

<SignatureMethod

Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more/rsa-ripemd160" />

2.3.6. ECDSA-SHA*

Identifiers

http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha1
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha224
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha384
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha512

The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [FIPS-186-2] is the elliptic curve analogue of the DSA (DSS) signature method. For detailed specifications on how to use it with SHA hash functions and XML Digital Signature, please see [X9.62] and [ECDSA].

2.3.7. ESIGN-SHA1

Identifier

http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#esign-sha1
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#esign-sha224
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#esign-sha256
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#esign-sha384
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#esign-sha512

The ESIGN algorithm specified in [IEEE-P1363a] is a signature scheme based on the integer factorization problem. It is much faster than previous digital signature schemes so ESIGN can be implemented on smart cards without special co-processors.

An example of use is:

<SignatureMethod

Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#esign-shal" />

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2.4. Minimal Canonicalization

Thus far two independent interoperable implementations of Minimal Canonicalization have not been announced. Therefore, when XML Digital Signature was advanced from Proposed Standard [RFC3075] to Draft Standard [RFC3275], Minimal Canonicalization was dropped from the standards track documents. However, there is still interest in Minimal Canonicalization, indicating its possible future use. For its definition, see [RFC3075], Section 6.5.1.

For reference, its identifier remains: http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#minimal

2.5. Transform Algorithms

Note that all CanonicalizationMethod algorithms can also be used as transform algorithms.

2.5.1. XPointer

Identifier: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more/xptr

This transform algorithm takes an [XPointer] as an explicit parameter. An example of use is [RFC3092]:

<Transform

```
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more/xptr">
    <XPointer
        xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more/xptr">
            xpointer(id("foo")) xmlns(bar=http://foobar.example)
            xpointer(//bar:Zab[@Id="foo"])
     </XPointer>
```

</Transform>

Schema Definition:

<element name="XPointer" type="string">

DTD:

<!ELEMENT XPointer (#PCDATA) >

Input to this transform is an octet stream (which is then parsed into $\ensuremath{\mathsf{XML}}\xspace).$

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Output from this transform is a node set; the results of the XPointer are processed as defined in the XMLDSIG specification [RFC3275] for a same document XPointer.

2.6. EncryptionMethod Algorithms

This subsection gives identifiers and information for several EncryptionMethod Algorithms.

2.6.1. ARCFOUR Encryption Algorithm

Identifier: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#arcfour

ARCFOUR is a fast, simple stream encryption algorithm that is compatible with RSA Security's RC4 algorithm. An example of the EncryptionMethod element using ARCFOUR is

Note that Arcfour makes use of the generic KeySize parameter specified and defined in [XMLENC].

2.6.2. Camellia Block Encryption

Identifiers: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia128-cbc http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia192-cbc http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia256-cbc

Camellia is an efficient and secure block cipher with the same interface as the AES [Camellia, RFC3713], that is 128-bit block size and 128, 192, and 256 bit key sizes. In XML Encryption, Camellia is used in the same way as the AES: It is used in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with a 128-bit initialization vector (IV). The resulting cipher text is prefixed by the IV. If included in XML output, it is then base64 encoded. An example Camellia EncryptionMethod is as follows:

<EncryptionMethod
Algorithm=
 "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia128-cbc" />

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2.6.3. Camellia Key Wrap

```
Identifiers:
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia128
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia192
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia256
```

The Camellia [Camellia, RFC3713] key wrap is identical to the AES key wrap algorithm [RFC3394] specified in the XML Encryption standard with "AES" replaced by "Camellia". As with AES key wrap, the check value is 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6.

The algorithm is the same regardless of the size of the Camellia key used in wrapping (called the key encrypting key or KEK). The implementation of Camellia is OPTIONAL. However, if it is supported, the same implementation guidelines of which combinations of KEK size and wrapped key size should be required to be supported and which are optional to be supported should be followed as for AES. That is to say, if Camellia key wrap is supported, then wrapping 128-bit keys with a 128-bit KEK and wrapping 256-bit keys with a 256-bit KEK are REQUIRED and all other combinations are OPTIONAL.

An example of use is:

```
<EncryptionMethod
Algorithm=
   "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia128" />
```

2.6.4. PSEC-KEM

```
Identifier:
    http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#psec-kem
```

The PSEC-KEM algorithm, specified in [ISO/IEC-18033-2], is a key encapsulation mechanism using elliptic curve encryption.

An example of use is:

```
<EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#psec-kem">
    <ECParameters>
        <Version>version</Version>
        <FieldID>id</FieldID>
        <Curve>curve</Curve>
        <Base>base</Base>
        <Order>order</Order>
        <Cofactor>cofactor</Cofactor>
        </ECParameters>
```

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</EncryptionMethod>

See [ISO/IEC-18033-2] for information on the parameters above.

3. KeyInfo

In section 3.1 a new KeyInfo element child is specified, while in section 3.2 additional KeyInfo Type values for use in RetrievalMethod are specified.

3.1. PKCS #7 Bag of Certificates and CRLs

A PKCS #7 [RFC2315] "signedData" can also be used as a bag of certificates and/or certificate revocation lists (CRLs). The PKCS7signedData element is defined to accommodate such structures within KeyInfo. The binary PKCS #7 structure is base64 [RFC2405] encoded. Any signer information present is ignored. The following is an example, eliding the base64 data [RFC3092]:

<foo:PKCS7signedData

xmlns:foo="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more">

. . .

</foo:PKCS7signedData>

3.2. Additional RetrievalMethod Type Values

The Type attribute of RetrievalMethod is an optional identifier for the type of data to be retrieved. The result of dereferencing a RetrievalMethod reference for all KeyInfo types with an XML structure is an XML element or document with that element as the root. The various "raw" key information types return a binary value. Thus, they require a Type attribute because they are not unambiguously parseable.

Identifiers:

http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#KeyValue http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#RetrievalMethod http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#KeyName http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rawX509CRL http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rawPGPKeyPacket http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rawSPKISexp http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#PKCS7signedData http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rawPKCS7signedData

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4. IANA Considerations

As it is easy for people to construct their own unique URIS [RFC2396] and possibly obtain a URI from the W3C if appropriate, it is not intended that any additional "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#" URIs be created beyond those enumerated in this document. (W3C Namespace stability rules prohibit the creation of new URIs under "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#".)

5. Security Considerations

Due to computer speed and cryptographic advances, the use of MD5 as a DigestMethod and the use of MD5 in the RSA-MD5 SignatureMethod is NOT RECOMMENDED. The concerned cryptographic advances do not effect the security of HMAC-MD5; however, there is little reason not to use one of the SHA series of algorithms.

Acknowledgements

Glenn Adams, Merlin Hughs, Gregor Karlinger, Brian LaMachia, Shiho Moriai, Joseph Reagle, Russ Housley, and Joel Halpern.

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[FIPS-180-2change]	"FIPS 180-2, Secure Hash Standard Change Notice 1", adds SHA-224 to [FIPS 180-2], 25 February 2004.
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[EXCANON]	<pre>"Exclusive XML Canonicalization Version 1.0", D. Eastlake, J. Reagle, 18 July 2002. <http: rec-xml-enc-c14n-20020718="" tr="" www.w3.org=""></http:>.</pre>
[RFC3076]	Boyer, J., "Canonical XML Version 1.0", RFC 3076, March 2001.

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RFC 4051	Additional XML Security URIs	April 2005
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Acknowledgement

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.

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